Ready for the Post-Pandemic World?

The migrant worker dormitory clusters, although certainly a serious matter, might seem like just a blemish in an otherwise stellar record of successful crisis management by a high-capacity government responsible for developing Singapore from a "Third World” to a "First World” country in a very short period. Made up of very capable technocrats with a pragmatic outlook, this government focused on results, were quick to react to problems as they surfaced, and never took its eye away from the unsentimental task of keeping its globally embedded economy going as a vital part of national survival. Some might argue, further, that the authorities and countless other people in Singapore who volunteered their support did the best they could, in the context of an unprecedented and unpredictable pandemic of this scale and magnitude. However, the dormitory clusters and other lapses are symptoms of deeper structural problems. This is an important perspective that can constructively provide insight into whether these kinds of problems will manifest again and again in occasional eruptions and disruptions, which are painful but manageable. Or whether they will lead to more systemically destructive outcomes over time, which will either ruin Singapore eventually or create the opportunity to rebuild something better. Given Singapore's track record of swift and effective reaction to problems, one can expect economic rejuvenation at some point, accompanied by social and cultural exuberance. But will this mean returning to business-asusual? And will the deep structures shaped by authoritarian politics and market fundamentalism continue to worsen income inequality, poverty, an over-dependency on exploited migrant workers, the neglect of heterotopic spaces of otherness, and a dogmatic refusal by the government to engage more widely and in good faith with a broader range of people and perspectives outside its circle? © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022.

Neoliberal Globalization, Authoritarian Populism, and Moral Panics

At the start of Singapore's first year of living with COVID-19, its government was praised internationally for its ability to control the spread of the virus through high standards of testing, tracing, and isolation, the basic elements of communicable disease control. Its success strengthened both its brand as a global city and its national narrative often referred to as "The Singapore Story”. However, the first year of COVID-19 also exposed weaknesses in the Singapore system of development, governance, and policymaking. And yet, that very same system seemed, at least on the surface, sufficiently resilient to correct the immediate problems and adapt to changing circumstances. The question perhaps is whether the Singapore system is capable of further adapting in the face of intensifying volatility, uncertainly, complexity, and ambiguity, the kind of future of which COVID-19 might in fact be merely a portent. How should lapses such as the serious outbreak of infection in the migrant worker dormitories be viewed? It is reasonable to admit that no government is perfect, not even in well-governed Singapore. One can also say that crisis of this kind can be unpredictable and so all one can hope for is that the authorities did the best that they could, given what they knew and the resources that they possessed. But, from these lapses, one could also gain insight into deeper problems of a structural or systemic nature. Putting out the proverbial fires, difficult as it is to do, may distract from their real causes, which could be subterranean, or climatic, or ideological. These causes are deeper than a simple explanatory chain linking events, behaviour, decisions, responsibility, and corrections. These deeper causes are all linked in some way to neoliberal globalization and authoritarian populist responses to it. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022.

Populist views of science: how social media, political affiliation, and Alt-Right support affect scientific attitudes in the United States

The growth of populist movements in the US necessitates further understanding of how they use social media and evaluate elites. Work on populist attitudes suggests skepticism of elites is not limited to political domains but extends into online and scientific spaces. This study draws on the recently articulated concept of science populism as well as social media usage to examine Alt-Right and institutional partisans' attitudes toward scientific elites. Using an online survey our findings are threefold: first, Alt-Right supporters hold stronger science populist beliefs than Republicans/Democrats;second, heavy social media use bridges the gap in partisans' science populist beliefs, as Democrats come to hold more populist attitudes with increased social media use;and third, science populist beliefs are associated with maladaptive health behaviors through lower COVID-19 vaccine intentions. We discuss implications for understanding how political affiliation and social media use are associated with populist attitudes and their potential to cause individual and societal harms. [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Information, Communication & Society is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)

Existential insecurity and deference to authority: the pandemic as a natural experiment

IntroductionThe global coronavirus pandemic offers a quasi-experimental setting for understanding the impact of sudden exposure to heightened existential risk upon both individual and societal values. MethodsWe examined the effect of the pandemic on political attitudes by comparing data from eight countries surveyed before and after the worldwide spread of COVID-19 in March 2020 with continuous weekly polling tracker data from the United Kingdom from 2019 to 2021. Multilevel models were used to explore the drivers of change, and the results indicated that reported emotions of fear and stress were positively associated with institutional approval during periods of greater pathogen risk. ResultsOur findings revealed that support for political and technocratic authority, as well as satisfaction with political institutions, rose significantly above long-term historical baselines during the pandemic. DiscussionThe results support the hypothesis that exposure to existential risk results in greater support for authority and that individual feelings of insecurity may be linked to less critical citizen orientations.

Two Major Economic Crises in the Early Twenty-First Century and their Impact on Central Bank Independence

Two major economic crises in the early twenty-first century have had a serious impact on monetary policy and CB independence. Disruption in financial intermediation and associated deflationary pressures caused by the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 and European financial crisis of 2010–2015 pushed central banks (CBs) in major currency areas towards adoption of unconventional monetary policy measures, including large-scale purchase of government bonds (quantitative easing). The same approach has been taken by CBs in response to the COVID-19 crisis in 2020 even if the characteristics of this crisis differ from the previous one. As a result of both crises, CBs have become major holders of government bonds and de facto – main creditors of governments. Against rapidly deteriorating fiscal balances, CBs have become hostages of fiscal policies, which compromises their independence. Risks to the CB independence also come from their additional mandates (beyond price stability) and populist political pressures.

When Right-Wing Populism Becomes Distorted Public Health Communication: Tracing the Roots of Jair Bolsonaro's Epidemiological Denialism

This article delineates key links between right-wing populism and epidemiological denialism. Building on a comparative analysis of central tropes from Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro's 2018 campaign and his public-facing response to the COVID-19 pandemic, we argue that his engagement during both periods employs two key elements of right-wing populism: Antielitism, or the view that the political establishment is irredeemably disconnected from the citizenry, and anti-pluralism, or the blaming of political and social problems on scapegoat populations. During the COVID-19 outbreak, this denigration of public trust fuels denialism or the systemic attempt to downplay severity to minimize public response. Developing a thematic analysis around Bolsonaro's speeches, interviews, and personal social media, we address how anti-elitist and anti-pluralist strategies from the 2018 campaign inform the pandemic response. These include the discrediting of governmental bodies, the villainization of progressive activists, and the assignation of blame on foreign actors. Our goal is to provide an in-depth case study of how communication bolstering epidemiological denialism is propagated-an increasingly vital conversation as right-wing populism and health misinformation proliferate.

Commemorative Populism in the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Strategic (Ab)use of Memory in Anti-Corona Protest Communication on Telegram

During the COVID-19 pandemic, self-proclaimed resistance movements have organized protests against containment measures both in digital media and on the streets. References to the past and an invocation of collective memory have been important elements in the toolbox of their populist communication. We propose the notion of "commemorative populism" to describe the weaponization of history and memory for the proliferation of a political cause by populist activists. In a qualitative content analysis, we examined postings by the German "Querdenker," a movement against Corona containment policies. Findings show 6 types of the (ab)use of history and collective memory: (1) the recontextualization of quotations by historical personalities, (2) the creation of false historical analogies and flattering genealogies, (3) the claim of historical exceptionalism, (4) the denigration of elites by referring to failures of medical history, (5) the dissemination of disinformation about historical facts, and (6) the support of conspiracy myths by the myths' own history.

Pandemic Populism: Explaining Support for the People's Party of Canada in the 2021 Federal Election

The COVID-19 pandemic has seen opponents of public health mandates deploy a range of populist and anti-elite arguments. The 2021 Canadian federal election was an exceptional "pandemic election" in which the COVID-19 health crisis took centre stage. But the election campaign also saw the populist People's Party of Canada (PPC) rise to prominence by opposing pandemic-related public health restrictions. While the party failed to win a seat, it did manage to triple its vote share (1.6 per cent to 4.9 per cent). It is unclear, however, what factors led to the rise in support for the PPC. To explore this issue, we draw on an original post-election survey (n = 18,950) and focus on populist attitudes and opposition to COVID-19-related public health restrictions. Results from regression models and structural equation models (SEMs) indicate that opposition to public health restrictions was a much stronger factor than populism in shaping support for the PPC.

Is Latin America Experiencing a Second Cycle of Leftist Politics?

Recent electoral victories by left-leaning leaders and parties mark another turn in the oscillations of Latin American politics, but they also signal enduring changes. The electoral success of the left is a sign of both the durability of electoral democracy and the persistence of social pres-sures in highly unequal societies. In this article, we discuss how the electoral fates and governing strategies of leftist movements and parties reflect the conditions in which they emerged. We ana-lyze the political and organizational legacies of Cold War repression as well as the ways in which global events such as 9/11, the commodity boom of the 2000s and its exhaustion, the covid-19 pandemic, and the new global wave of progressive movements, have shaped the ebb-and-flow of left-wing politics. We conclude with reflections on the possibilities for the construction of social democracy as an alternative to radical populist and right-wing oligarchical politics. © 2023, Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas A.C.. All rights reserved.

Does communist nostalgia lead to COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs?

Why are people in Central and Eastern Europe more hesitant towards COVID-19 vaccination and more prone to believe in COVID-19 related conspiracy theories than other Europeans? The article claims that the spread of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs in the post-communist region might be fostered by communist nostalgia. Drawing on the survey data from Lithuania, I show that communist nostalgia is one of the best predictors of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, controlling for other related factors such as populist attitudes, trust in political institutions, confidence in media and scientists and pro-Western attitudes. The paper claims that communist nostalgia in Central and Eastern Europe is conducive to conspiracy beliefs in a similar vein as nostalgic narratives employed by populist radical right in Western countries. [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of European Societies is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)

Italy: Populism and Business in a Stagnant Economy

This chapter provides an overview of how populism has evolved in Italy since the 1990s, focusing in particular on the political changes occurred after the crisis of 2008. It shows that the collapse of mainstream parties has been accompanied by the rise of the League and the 5 Star Movement (M5S), two populist parties which have challenged EU control over budgets and austerity policies. The League provides an interesting case of populist party characterized by high levels of ideological ‘adaptability'—confirming the ‘chameleonic' nature of populist parties—and oscillating between support for neo-liberal economic policies and pro-welfare positions (filtered through the lens of its nativist ideology). This is then linked to a discussion of how business associations have responded to the new wave of populist politics started during the Great Recession. It is argued that the ambiguous position of Italian populists on economic issues is mirrored by ambiguous responses from business elites, which also reflect the divide existing between small-/medium-sized enterprises and large industrial and financial companies. Overall, a ‘soft voice' business response to populism seems to have prevailed—it became louder only when confronted with clearly redistributive policies proposed by the M5S. The last part of the chapter also considers more recent developments following the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, which marks a new critical juncture in Italian (and world) politics and economy. © The Editors and Contributors 2023. All rights reserved.

Conservative government penal policy 2015-2021: Austerity, outsourcing and punishment redux?

This book interrogates Conservative government penal policy for adult and young adult offenders in England and Wales between 2015 and 2021. Government penal policy is shown to have been often ineffective and costly, and to have revived efforts to push the system towards a disastrous combination of austerity, outsourcing and punishment that has exacerbated the penal crisis. This investigation has meant touching on topical debates dealing with the impact of resource scarcity on offenders' experiences of the penal system, the impact of an increasing emphasis on punishment on offenders' sense of justice and fairness, the balance struck between infection control and offender welfare during the government handling of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and why successive Conservative governments have intransigently pursued a penal policy that has proved crisis-exacerbating. The overall conclusion reached is that penal policy is too important to be left to governments alone and needs to be recalibrated by a one-off inquiry, complemented by an on-going advisory body capable of requiring governments to 'explain or change'. The book is distinctive in that it provides a critical review of penal policy change, whist combining this with insights derived from the sociological analysis of penal trends. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022.

Pandemic Denialism: The Case of COVID-19

This article develops a typology on COVID-19 denialism so we might better understand its sources and what can be done to counter them. The typology will analyze denialism as manifested in great power competition, driven by economics and business interests, motivated by political ideology and populist movements, caused by national security imperatives, and compromised by politicized science. The article also examines the use by China and Russia of social media such as Twitter to create "epistemological chaos" in the industrialized democracies about COVID-19 to further their strategic goals and undermine public confidence in science and technology. Finally, the article concludes with some thoughts on how the social media has replaced traditional news media as a source of information for the public generally, but specifically how it has distorted the public's information about the pandemic and vaccines developed to protect against COVID.

Is Democracy Lost?

President Kais Saied's de facto dissolution of parliament in July 2021, abandonment of the constitution, and targeting of the opposition are clear signs that Tunisia is no longer a democracy and has returned to the authoritarian playbook of Arab leaders past and present. I see three main reasons for this abrupt end to Tunisia's decade-old democracy: 1) the failure to accompany political reform with socioeconomic gains for citizens;2) the subsequent rise of populism;and 3) the mistakes of the Islamic party. To move forward in Tunisia and the Arab world more broadly, prodemocratic forces must link freedom, development, and social justice.

Populism and Contemporary Democracy in Europe: Old Problems and New Challenges

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of populism on the European democratic polity. In the last two decades, European democracies have come under strain amid growing populism. By asserting the superiority of the majority over the law, of direct democracy over representation, and claiming the necessity to defend national sovereignty against foreign interferences, the populist conception of democracy is in stark contrast with the longstanding Western notion of liberal democracy. This volume investigates populist attempts to radically change what Bobbio called the "rules of the game" of democracy from an eminently legal perspective. Weaving together normative and empirical analysis, the contributions focus on the institutions that have suffered the most from the rise of populism as well as those that have better resisted the populist tide. Special attention will be paid to the Venice Commission's opinions and documents, as they represent the best European standards to evaluate the extent to which populism deviates from constitutional democracy requirements. The book also considers the responses of European States to the explosion of the COVID-19 pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic has indeed been an accelerator of known and studied trends in most constitutional systems, such as the concentration of powers in the executive hands and the consequential loss of parliament's centrality. Various forms of populism across Europe have thus found an ideal breeding ground to implement their agenda of granting the executive broad regulatory and decision-making powers while loosening parliamentary and judicial checks. Against this backdrop, the book analyses how European democracies should adapt to the challenges posed by the pandemic, as this reflection can help respond to populist threats and propose a way forward for liberal democracy. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022.

Politicians and immigration on Facebook: how the migration discourse is (de)legitimized during the health emergency

In this article we analyse how the immigration issue is narrated during the Covid-19 outbreak by several Italian political actors. We select Facebook as the main digital arena of political communication in the Italian public sphere. Quantitative analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis have been applied to politicians' posts aiming at identifying the linguistic strategies that contribute to instrumentalizing the emergency and aim to reinforce the politicization of the issue. Findings suggest that the main discursive strategies used by politicians do not only include migrants as a danger for the spread of the virus, but the migratory narration is systematically organized on negative campaigning blaming political opponents. The contribution helps to reveal how the anti-migration discourse is reproduced during the Covid-19 outbreak and how the politicization of the migration serves as a context for the normalization of migrant's exclusion.

The Czech 2021 General Election and Its Impact on the Party System*

The article analyses the results of the 2021 general election in the Czech Republic. The election was shaped by two major factors. First, it took place in the shadow of the Covid pandemic crisis. Second, the Czech Republic was governed by a cabinet dominated by a populist political party with unprecedented support from the communist party for most of the term. The major feature of the election campaign was the formation and eventual victory of two anti-populist coalitions. The results brought about a decrease in electoral volatility and fragmentation of the party system. However, the formation of ideologically diverse coalitions is a challenge to the increased stability of the party politics. Moreover, the electoral loss of two traditional leftist parties (the Communists and the Social Democrats) is a major change in the logic of party competition. The populist/anti-populist logic of the campaign undermined the discursive salience of left-right issues and suppressed the usual policy-based competition. Nevertheless, analysis of the electorate shows the dominant role of policy issues in the voters' decision making.

The formulation of anti-vaccination mandate views in social work: Unpacking dissent

INTRODUCTION: A feature of the Covid-19 pandemic in Aotearoa New Zealand was the introduction of mass vaccination and vaccine mandates as public health measures to minimise serious illness and deaths. These measures were generally popular, with wide support, and 90% uptake of vaccines across the eligible population. A minority, however, objected strenuously to both mass vaccination and mandates. In a stressful period, this opposition and the unrest generated significant conflict. Social work was not immune to this conflict. Approach: This commentary explores the nature of dissent in social work about vaccines in Aotearoa New Zealand after August 2021, drawing on theoretical explanations of vaccine hesitancy and refusal. Social theory is helpful in unpacking arguments for and against public health initiatives. Conclusions: Opposition to vaccine mandates has been framed as legitimate dissent where freedom and rights are largely conceptualised within a lens of neoliberal individualism. Social work values heavily weigh in on the side of a collectivist public health approach and this does not negate human rights.

Resisting Genderphobia in Hungary

In this article, we connect illiberal populism in Hungary with the instrumentalizing of genderphobia through state policies starting from 2010. This became especially salient during the COVID-19 pandemic when a contentious state of emergency laws enabled the government's ruling by decree. Analyzing relevant pieces of legislation and policy documents, we show how genderphobia became a fundamental feature of an expanding far-right agenda that has been playing out in practice since the System of National Cooperation was established in 2010. Genderphobia is the aversion to disrupting dominant gender and sexual hierarchies, by addressing and critically interrogating gendered differences and gender as a social construct. Genderphobia is both an ideology about the fearfulness of gender as well as the action of fear-mongering for political effect. State institutions are gendered and sexualized in that they have been structured on dominant gender and sexual norms that reinforce male and heterosexual dominance. We argue that genderphobia is evident in the rise of anti-LGBTIQ policies and contributes to the weakening of democratic and liberal institutions in Hungary. We will also present examples of the Hungarian government's attempts to monopolize the definition of "the family" and hollow out the social representation of child protection. In addition, we will explore resistance against the recent anti-LGBTIQ policies through children's literature. Our aim is to demonstrate how the Hungarian genderphobic policies ultimately deny not only LGBTIQ human rights but the existence of LGBTIQ youth and children who could benefit from social support as well as representation in education and literature.